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RACIAL EQUALITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: WHAT'S
TAX POLICY GOT TO DO WITH IT?
Dorothy A. Brown*
"[T]ax... statutes... may be more burdensome to the poor and to the
average black than to the more affluent white."'
In 1976, Supreme Court Justice Byron White recognized that tax statutes
may have a disparate impact based upon race.2 Yet, it has taken the legal
academy until the 1990's to begin to address those issues,3 and given the
recent spate of attacks, many still are unwilling to accept the proposition.4
I. BACKGROUND
I first began thinking about these issues after reading Professor Jerome
Culp's article Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original
Understandings.5 That thinking has resulted in several articles6 in which I
* Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law, Cincinnati, Ohio. B.S. 1980,
Fordham University; J.D. 1983, Georgetown University Law Center; L.L.M. 1984, New York
University. First I would like to thank Dean Smith for the opportunity to participate in the
Altheimer Symposium on Racial Equity in the 21st Century. I would like to thank Professors
Karen Brown, Karen Burke, Mary Louise Fellows, Donna Nagy, Wendy Parker, john powell,
and Michael Solimine for helpful comments. I would also like to thank the participants at the
University of Cincinnati College of Law Faculty Workshop. I would especially like to thank
Ms. Laura McKinley and Mr. Mark Dinkelacker for excellent research assistance.
1. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
2. See id.
3. See Mary Louise Fellows, Rocking the Tax Code (A Case Study of Employment-
Related Child Care Expenditures), 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307 (1998); Karen B. Brown, Not
Color-or-Gender-Neutral: New Tax Treatment of Employment Discrimination Damages, 7
REv. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 223 (1998); Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in
Black and White, in TAXINGAMERICA 45 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996).
See also Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint
Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1469 (1997); Dorothy A. Brown, Split Personalities: Tax
Law and Critical Race Theory, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 89 (1997); Beverly I. Moran &
William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 751.
4. See Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1521,
1526 (1998) ("I am less convinced of the merits of the critical race tax project, although it is too
early to dismiss the approach."); James D. Bryce, A Critical Evaluation of the Tax Crits, 76
N.C. L. REv. 1687 (1998) ("Recent years have seen the spread of legal academia's favorite
obsession-sex and race as the origin of all of society's ills--to the tax law. In my view, this
is not a helpful development." (footnotes omitted)); Charles 0. Galvin, Taking Critical Tax
Theory Seriously--A Comment, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1749, 1752 (1998) ("Like Professor Zelenak,
I find the critical race theorists' criticisms unconvincing.").
5. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and
Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39.
6. See Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty, supra note 3; Brown, Race, Class, and
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have examined Census Bureau data, among others, as a proxy for taxable
household income, because the Internal Revenue Service does not collect
taxpayer data by race.7 My previous research shows that in one area, namely
the joint return provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, taxpayers bear the
costs of those provisions differently based upon their race Blacks pay a
higher tax as a result of getting married than do whites ("the marriage
penalty") and whites pay less in taxes as a result of getting married than do
blacks ("the marriage bonus").9 My previous research shows that black
married couples disproportionately pay the marriage penalty and white
couples, particularly upper-income white couples, disproportionately receive
a marriage bonus."0
You may ask how this is possible given that the Internal Revenue Code
is race-neutral on its face. There is nothing in the Code that explicitly says
blacks pay more, whites pay less. This is still America-isn't it? I submit,
because this is America, one could intuitively expect to observe racial
disparities in the implementation of our federal tax laws, which date back to
the Sixteenth Amendment and the Revenue Act of 1913."
The marriage penalty hits the hardest where husbands and wives
contribute roughly equal amounts to total household income.' The marriage
bonus is the greatest when only one spouse is contributing to total household
income by working in the paid labor market.'3 When you examine the
households in the Census Bureau sample, black households were most likely
to have co-equal wage earners and white households were most likely to have
sole wage earners.
4
Gender Essentialism, supra note 3; Dorothy A. Brown, Split Personalities, supra note 3;
Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty: Legislative Solutions in Black and White, N.Y. L. SCH.
I. HUM. RTS.(forthcoming 1999).
7. See Brown, Split Personalities, supra note 3, at 91; Brown, The Marriage
Bonus/Penalty, supra note 3, at 49; Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism, supra note
3, at n.147.
8. See Brown, Split Personalities, supra note 3, at 93; Brown, The Marriage
Bonus/Penalty, supra note 3, at 49-50; Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism, supra
note 3, at 1498-1507.
9. See Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism, supra note 3, at 1498-1507.
10. See Brown, Race Class, and Gender Essentialism, supra note 3, at 1498-1504.
11. Cf DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM oF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM 12 (1992) ("Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even those
herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary 'peaks of progress,'
short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain
white dominance. This is a hard-to-accept fact that all history verifies.")
12. See Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism, supra note 3, at 1479.
13. See Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism, supra note 3, at 1479.




AFRICAN-AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME ALLOCATION
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
1000//0% 900/o/10% 800/o/20% 700//30% 600/0/40%
Income Levels - -
900/o/10% 80°/20% 700//30% 600/40% 500/o/50%
$0 to 10,000 84.06% 3.60% 3.70% 3.57% 5.06%
$10,001 to 20,000 63.25% 7.32% 8.02% 8.76% 12.65%
$20,001 to 30,000 38.81% 7.75% 12.20% 16.13% 25.11%
$30,001 to 40,000 26.07% 7.76% 12.94% 20.08% 33.16%
$40,001 to 50,000 15.42% 6.87% 13.70% 25.68% 38.33%
$50,001 to 60,000 9.22% 6.13% 14.00% 27.45% 43.21%
$60,001 to 70,000 6.37% 4.57% 14.13% 28.17% 46.76%
$70,001 to 80,000 6.59% 4.21% 11.73% 28.23% 49.23%
$80,001 to 90,000 5.88%1 3.81% 14.62% 26.17% 49.53%
$90,001 to 100,000 6.55% 7.52% 14.90% 26.88% 44.15%
$100,001 to 120,000 9.24% 7.60% 18.35% 28.66% 36.15%
$120,001 & over 37.40% 14.54% 14.12%1 11.98% 21.96%
This table shows at the $20,000 and under income level, African-
Americans are most likely to be in single wage earner households. Between
$30,001 and $120,000 household income levels, African-Americans are most
likely to be in dual wage-earning marriage penalty households. At $120,001
and higher household income African-Americans are more likely to be in
15. See Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism, supra note 3, at 1504 (reprinted
with permission of the publisher). (Excluded from the discussion in this article are the severe
marriage penalties imposed by the earned income tax credit.) See Brown, Race, Class, and
Gender Essentialism, supra note 3, at 1479-1481.
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marriage bonus households. As a result, the greatest percentages of African-
American households are marriage penalty households.
Table 1.216
WHITE HOUSEHOLD INCOME ALLOCATION
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
Contribution Percentages
1000/0/-
Income Levels 0% 900//10% 800/120% 700//30% 600//40%
900//1- 800//20% 700//30% 600/o/40% 500/0/50%
0%
$0 to 10,000 87.49% 2.85% 2.89% 2.80% 3.97%
$10,001 to 20,000 69.11% 6.88% 7.18% 7.26% 9.58%
$20,001 to 30,000 53.21% 9.27% 10.87% 11.47% 15.18%
$30,001 to 40,000 41.63% 10.77% 12.79% 15.43% 19.38%
$40,001 to 50,000 32.87% 10.86% 14.39% 18.55% 23.33%
$50,001 to 60,000 27.00% 10.63% 14.77% 20.88% 26.72%
$60,001 to 70,000 24.15% 9.80% 16.44% 21.44% 28.17%
$70,001 to 80,000 26.06% 9.27% 14.63% 22.25% 27.79%
$80,001 to 90,000 26.54% 10.27% 15.98% 20.04% 27.17%
$90,001 to 100,000 35.98% 9.78% 14.52% 16.74% 22.97%
$100,001 to 36.61% 12.57% 15.17% 16.17% 19.48%
120,000
$120,001 & over 58.88% 13.07% 10.47% 7.70% 9.42%
16. See Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism, supra note 3, at 1505 (reprinted
with permission of the publisher).
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White households up to $60,000 are more likely to be in single wage
earner households, and once over $30,000 household income, most likely to
receive a marriage bonus. Interestingly enough middle income white
households in the $60,000-90,000 income levels were most likely to pay a
marriage penalty. For households earning over $90,000 more whites receive
the marriage bonus than pay the marriage penalty.
Total household income is a result of wages earned in the paid labor
market. One reason that black couples contribute roughly half of household
income and white couples are more likely to be in sole wage earner
households is a function of race discrimination in the paid labor market.' 7 It
is those issues that the balance of this article will address.
11. CURRENT TAX POLICY AND
RACE DISCRIMINATION IN THELABOR MARKET
My charge, from Dean Smith, was to suggest a change in the Internal
Revenue Code that would work toward the goal of achieving racial equity in
the twenty-first century. I believe there is no greater culprit that prevents the
achievement of racial equality in this country than the systemic racism found
throughout the paid labor market.' My proposal therefore will be to use the
federal tax laws to disrupt the wage discrimination faced by workers of color.
I would like to begin by giving you some background statistical
information that I suspect is all too familiar. For 1995, the Census Bureau
reported median weekly earnings for white males, of $566, for black males
$411, for black females $355, for Hispanic males $350, for Hispanic females
$305. The unemployment rate for whites was 4.9% for 1995, for blacks was
10.4%, for Hispanics 9.3%."
17. When I refer to race discrimination in the paid labor market, I am referring only to the
disparate wages earned based upon race. Cf. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
ECONOMIC STATUS OF BLACK WOMEN: AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION (1990) ("Many
factors... combine to lower black women's economic status. .. [including] the relatively lower
incomes of other family members, especially the lower labor market earnings of their
husbands.... Racial discrimination in the labor market may depress black women's wages and
occupational status, increase their unemployment rates, and indirectly lower their labor force
participation rates.").
18. See ONE AMERICA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FORGING A NEW FUTURE 67 (1998)
"[S] ignificant disparity remains between the earnings capacity, economic propensity, and wealth
of whites and most minority groups."
19. See Brown, Not Color-or-Gender-Neutral, supra note 3, at 224-225 (citing BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1996). The Bureau of Labor Statistics does not currently tabulate monthly and annual average
data separately for Asian-Americans. See E-mail from Francis Horvath, Office of Employment
and Unemployment Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics (Mar. 29, 1999).
20. See Brown, Not Color-or-Gender-Neutral, supra note 3, at 224-25.
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Class action lawsuits alleging job discrimination more than doubled
between 1993 and 1997 .2 A July 1998 New York Times article reveals that
under welfare reform for the first time in the history of our country, there will
be more minorities on welfare than whites because employers are preferring
to hire white welfare recipients over welfare recipients of color.22
Employment discrimination, while an evil in its own right, leads to more
serious consequences." Wealth has been described as "one indicator of
material disparity that captures the historical legacy of low wages, personal
and organizational discrimination, and institutionalized racism. One road to
wealth is long-term steady employment in the kinds of work organizations that
offer job-sponsored benefits and retirement packages."'24 Similarly, the lack
of those employment opportunities over the long-term "result[s] in less
savings, less investments, and less transfers to succeeding generations. Over
time, less income can result in vast differences in asset accumulation." 25
In 1993, white households had median measured net worth of $45,740
while black households had median measured net worth of $4,418.26 In the
highest income level, the median net worth of whites was $123,350 and of
blacks was $45,023.2" In the lowest income level, the median net worth of
whites was $7,605, compared with $250 for blacks.28
How do the federal tax laws exacerbate societal racism that is reflected
in the paid labor market? This section will describe the tax treatment of
deductions under Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code. With limited
exceptions, employers can deduct all wages under Internal Revenue Code
Section 162(a)(1) provided they are ordinary, necessary, reasonable, for
services rendered, and incurred in a trade or business.29
Second, although the Supreme Court in 1958 announced a "public
policy" limitation on deductions under Section 162 of the Internal Revenue
Code, "if allowance of the deduction would frustrate sharply defined national
21. See Brown, Not Color-or-Gender-Neutral, supra note 3, at 225.
22. See Jason DeParle, Shrinking Welfare Rolls Leave Record High Share of Minorities:
Fast Exodus of Whites Alters the Racial Balance, N.Y. TIMEs, July 27, 1998, at Al.
23. See Regina Austin, Nest Eggs and Stormy Weather: Law, Culture, and Black
Women's Lack of Wealth, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 767, 773-775 (1997).
24. See MELVIN OLIvER & THOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 112(1995).
25. See MICHAEL SHERRADEN, ASSETS AND THE POOR WELFARE POLICY: A NEW
AMERICAN 131 (1991). As professor Cruz Reynoso has so eloquently reminded us in his
Keynote Address, the term "assets" has great significance. Assets is defined as "that which
enhances strength."
26. See Austin, supra note 23, at 769.
27. See Austin, supra note 23, at 769.
28. See Austin, supra note 23, at 769.
29. See I.R.C. § 162 (a)(1) (amended 1986).
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or state policies.., evidenced by some governmental declaration thereof,"3
Congress limited the instances in which courts could apply the public policy
doctrine.3' The 1969 Congressional amendments limited the applicability of
the public policy doctrine to the following: (i) a certain portion of punitive
damages in antitrust awards; 2 (ii) of fines or penalties paid to a government
for the violation of any law;33 (iii) or for illegal bribes or kickbacks. Further,
Treasury Regulations under Section 162 provide that "[a] deduction for an
expense... which would otherwise be allowable under section 162 shall not
be denied on the grounds that allowance of such deduction would frustrate a
sharply defined public policy."35 Therefore, it is well settled that courts are
unable to apply the public policy doctrine to any situation not already
proscribed by Congress in Section 162.
Third, it is generally accepted that employment discrimination awards are
deductible by the discriminator under Section 162, regardless of whether the
damage awards are compensatory or punitive.36
With respect to the income side, the recipient of employment
discrimination awards are held to have received taxable income regardless of
whether the damage awards are compensatory or punitive.37 Further, wages
received by employees who were discriminated against on the basis of race,
will constitute taxable income.3 ' Discriminators can deduct their wage
expenses and the discriminated against are taxed upon those wages.
Well, what does this all mean and what changes would I make to federal
tax law? What this means is that the federal government by allowing
deductions for wages paid in a racially discriminatory manner and allowing
30. See Tank Truck Rentals v. United States, 356 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1958).
31. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902, 83 Stat. 487, 710-11 (codified
as amended at 1.R.C. § 162).
32. See I.R.C. § 162(g).
33. See I.R.C. § 162(f); See also F. Philip Manns, Jr., Internal Revenue Code Section
162(): When Does the Payment of Damages to a Government Punish the Payor, 13 VA. TAX
REv. 271 (1993).
34. See I.R.C. § 162(c)(2).
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a). See also SENATE COMM. ONFIN., TAxREFORMACTOF 1969,
S. REP. No. 552, 91 st CONG. Ist SESS. 273, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2310 ("The
provision for the denial of the deduction for payments [of fines or similar penalties; of a portion
of treble damages, and of bribes or kickbacks] which are deemed to violate public policy is
intended to be all inclusive."). See also Kimberly A. Pace, The Tax Deductibility of Punitive
Damage Payments: Who Should Ultimately Bear the Burden for Corporate Misconduct, 47
ALA. L. REv. 825, 834 (1996).
36. See Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 57 (holding punitive damages deductible); See also
Rev. Rul. 69-581, 1969-2 CB 25 (holding compensatory damages deductible).
37. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2); See also Brown, Not Color-or Gender-Neutral, supra note 3,
at 243-244.
38. See I.R.C. § 61.
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deductions for actual damage awards, is subsidizing the race discriminator.
By taxing the award to the recipient the federal government is adding insult
to injury. If we lived in a society truly committed to racial equality, our
current tax law policies in this area would change.
III. REVAMPING THE FEDERAL TAx LAWS TO
DISCOURAGE LABOR FORCE DISCRIMINATION
How would I change the Internal Revenue Code to discourage employers
from discriminating on the basis of race? First, I would prohibit the deduction
by employers for the punitive and/or compensatory damage awards made in
race discrimination cases.39 Second, I would enact the proposal of Professor
Karen Brown of George Washington University "to exclude from taxation all
components ofjob bias awards" from the income of the person who has been
discriminated against.4" Third, I would prohibit the deduction by employers
of wages for ALL workers whenever the employer lost a race-based
employment discrimination lawsuit or settled a race-based employment
discrimination lawsuit, with respect to any of its workers. Fourth, and finally,
I would exclude from income the wages received by employees who were
discriminated against on the basis of race.4'
I would define race discrimination to include all instances where
damages were paid pursuant to a judgment against an employer who was
found to have discriminated against an employee on the basis of race as well
as damages paid in settlement of a lawsuit.42 We must remember that federal
39. I note that this proposal is equally applicable to other forms of labor market
discrimination including gender, sexual orientation, and disability. My proposal is limited to
race because of the nature of this symposium.
40. See Brown, Not Color-or-Gender-Neutral, supra note 3, at 266. See also Mary L.
Heen, An Alternative Approach to the Taxation of Employment Discrimination Recoveries
Under Federal Civil Rights Statutes: Income from Human Capital, Realization, and
Nonrecognition, 72 N.C. L. REV. 549, 554 ("[E]mployment discrimination recoveries such as
back pay and front pay should be excluded from income.... Punitive damages, on the other
hand, serve noncompensatory functions such as deterrence and retribution. Punitive damages
should therefore be included in income." (footnotes omitted)).
41. Cf A-Corps proposal designed to provide tax benefits to corporations willing to
provide certain employment benefits including training, education, health care and profit-
sharing to its workforce. 2/29/96 DALY TAX REP. 7.
42. I recognize there are those who argue against employment discrimination laws as
unnecessary to eradicate race discrimination due to free market principles and would
understandably oppose my proposals. See, e.g., GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); Richard Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136
U. PA. L. REv. 517 (1987); RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDs: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMiNATION LAWS (1992). I, however, tend to side with those who agree
with the existence of employment discrimination laws as a means of curbing discriminatory
behavior. See, e.g. Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987); Cass
766 [Vol. 2 1
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tax laws are widely believed to encourage behavior through allowing
deductions and credits and discourage behavior by denying deductions, or
imposing penalties.43 Why shouldn't federal tax laws be designed to
discourage race based employment discrimination? For as long as we have
had federal tax laws they have subsidized race discriminators by allowing
them complete deductions.
When Congress codified the public purpose doctrine in 1969, it observed
that to allow certain deductions would frustrate sharply defined national or
state policies." As a result, the public policy doctrine was enacted to prevent
a tax deduction from reducing the "sting" of a penalty intended to punish the
wrongdoer.45 Similarly here, denying wage deductions to employers who
discriminate on the basis of race as well as denying the deduction for the
judgment or settlement amount will penalize the employer. By denying the
deductions, the "sting" of the penalty will not be reduced. The race discrimi-
nator will be punished in civil court and will be punished again through the
operation of the federal tax laws. If eliminating discrimination on the basis of
race is a clearly defined national policy, this proposal must be adopted.
All other similarly situated employers who do not discriminate on the
basis of race will be able to take wage deductions. To the extent the company
were publicly held, one might expect shareholders to sell shares in Company
A, a race discriminator, not allowed to deduct wages and instead to purchase
stock in Company B, a non-race discriminator, allowed to deduct wages paid
to their employees. The race discriminator becomes an economic outcast and
must change practices if they are to continue operating. competitively.
With respect to the employees who receive damage awards or settle
lawsuits alleging race discrimination, those awards should be excluded from
taxable income in order to compensate the victims for the harms suffered. The
exclusion should provide an additional incentive to the employees to file suit
against their employers. In addition wages paid while the taxpayer was being
discriminated against should also be excluded for similar reasons. Assuming
most of their taxable income comes from wages, and withholding taxes were
Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, 8 SOC. PHIL & POL'Y 22 (1991); Judith
Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment Discrimination
Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487 (1997);
John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986); John J. Donohue
III, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legislation: A Reply to Judge Posner,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 523 (1987); John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature
of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991).
43. See Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism, supra note 3 at 1484 ("There is,
however, widespread support for the proposition that taxes influence behavior." (footnote
omitted)).




deducted, they should receive a refund of all taxes withheld for the years in
question. In order for the pervasiveness of racism to be eliminated, it must be
fought on several fronts.
This proposal seeks to move the employment playing field from an
overwhelmingly white, male field, to a more inclusive one.' Who would my
proposal not affect? Non-profits and governmental agencies because they are
not motivated by tax considerations. I leave, for another day, solutions to
address those entities.
If my proposals were enacted, one would expect to see a significant
diminishing of race based employment discrimination. People of color would
earn as much as whites. We would expect to see wealth in households of
color increase over time. We might even see more families of color in
marriage bonus households, because either wives or husbands of color would
earn sufficient amounts to become the sole wage earner.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the federal tax laws did not cause societal racism, they are
operating to exacerbate that racism by permitting employers who discriminate
on the basis of race to deduct their discriminatory damage awards as well as
deducting their discriminatory wages." The federal tax laws' role in
reinforcing societal racism must be explored, written about, challenged and
ultimately eliminated.
46. Cf FEDERALCLASSCELINGCOMM'N, GOODFOR BUSINESS: MAKINGFULLUSEOFTHE
NATION's HUMAN CAPrrAL iii-iv ("At the highest levels of business, there is indeed a barrier
only rarely penetrated by women or persons of color. Consider: 97% of the senior managers
of Fortune 1000 industrial and Fortune 500 companies are white; 95% to 97% are male.").
47. See TAXINGAMERICA 2 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) ("What
is missing from both the political and the academic debate about taxes is a serious consideration
of how the tax system exacerbates marketplace discrimination against traditionally subordinated
groups.").
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